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ABSTRACT 
The Canadian Federal Government has introduced several major ad hoc relief 
programs for Prairie farmers in the last fifty years, in response to various 
agricultural crises. Each of these programs has rewarded late adjusters --
farmers who contributed to the crises by not responding appropriately to market 
or environmental conditions. Early adjusters who quickly and innovatively 
responded have been treated indifferently or penalized by the programs. The 
1941 Wheat Acreage Reduction (WAR) program and 1970 Lower Inventory for Tomorrow 
(LIFT) favoured farmers who grew large acreages of wheat in the preceding years 
despite high levels of Canadian and world wheat stocks. Farmers who had cut 
production or diversified received less program money than the late adjusters. 
The Special Canadian Grains Program (SCGP) of 1986, introduced to offset low 
world prices in traditional crops, made no payments to special crop producers 
in its first year. Producers who cultivated below average quality land in a 
township or who planted traditional rotations regardless of, sometimes in spite 
of, climatic conditions in 1988 received much of the benefit of the Canadian Crop 
Drought Assistance Program (CCDAP). The 1989 Permanent Cover Program of the 
Canada-Saskatchewan Agreement on Soil Conservation will reward, at least in part, 
late adjusters who brought marginal land under cultivation, some as recently as 
July 1987, without regard for environmental consequences. 
Throughout the last fifty years, the deliveiY quota system, based on the 
number of acres farmed, has encouraged extensive farming techniques and the 
cultivation of marginal land. Farmers who practised annual cultivation of export 
crops may have maximized short run economic returns given the combined economic 
and policy signals which were received. Farmers who have tried to farm according 
to the best long-term agronomic practices have not been rewarded through policy 
initiatives. 
Ad hoc programs which have tried to move producers away from traditional 
Prairie crops and cultivation methods, especially wheat production, often have 
been poorly designed, underfunded and limited in scope. Fundamental federal 
government policies for Prairie agriculture, including the Homestead Act. the 
Land Survey, and the Crow Rate/Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) have 
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consistently pushed Prairie land use in a single direction, encouraging annual 
cultivation and the production of grain, especially wheat, for export at the 
expense of most other types of agricultural production. A precarious cyclical 
economy has been one result, especially in Saskatchewan. Deterioration of a 
significant portion of the land base has been another. The provincial land 
assessment and property taxation system may have institutionalized this land 
degradation. 
The "Wheat is King" tradition is still alive and well on the Prairies and 
in the minds of policy planners. Wheat will remain a major crop. However, 
governments which are serious about diversification in Prairie agriculture must 
begin to reward early adjusters -- those who innovate and respond appropriately 
to markets and the physical environment. Federal Government legislation for the 
Prairie region should be enabling, not disabling legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent Canadian Federal Government blueprint for the future of Canadian 
agriculture, Growing Together, states in the Ministers' Message that "the 
[agriculture] industry must be provided with a framework of consistent and 
predictable government programs ... "1 It goes on to say that market 
responsiveness, self reliance, regional diversity and environmental 
sustainability form the context in which a national agricultural policy with 
coherent programs must be developed. 
This paper reviews several federal government relief and development 
programs and policies, some ad hoc2 , some long-term, which primarily have been 
focused on the Western Canadian grain production sector. 3 These programs have 
provided conflicting signals to Prairie farmers about the direction of 
agricultural development. The result has been that farmers have adjusted late, 
or not at all, to market and environmental indicators because of inconsistencies 
between these indicators and national or regional policies. Government policies 
have often muzzled market signals and farmers wait for the government to take 
the initiative. The government has often responded slowly and inappropriately, 
with the rewards going to those who have waited to adjust. The irony is that 
those who adjust late are often left as well off as those who adjust early. 
The policies and programs reviewed in this paper and farmers' responses 
to them have tended to be firmly in the "Wheat is King" tradition of Prairie, 
especially Saskatchewan, agricultural development. Most of these programs have 
reinforced that tradition with both their timing and their payment mechanisms. 
Elements of these programs which have addressed or questioned this "Wheat is 
King" tradition have been small in scale, transitory in nature, inconsistent with 
overall policy direction and, therefore, unable to alter the foundations of 
Prairie agriculture. Figure 1 presents "A Concise Pictorial History of Policy 
Intervention in Saskatchewan Agriculture" in cartoon form. 
The Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program (CCDAP, 1988) and the Special 
Canadian Grains Program (SCGP, 1986) were introduced by the Canadian Federal 
1Agriculture Canada. Growing Together: A Vision for Canada's Agri-Food 
IndustiY. 1989, pp. 2-3. 
2ad hoc: 1wfor the particular end or purpose at hand and without reference 
to wider application or employment"; 2"made, established, acting, or concerned 
with a particular end or purpose". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(unabridged). Springfield, Mass., G. and C. Merriam Company, 1976, p.27. 
3This paper does not suggest that the Canadian livestock sector has had no 
program intervention. The Agricultural Stabilization Act, Tripartite 
Stabilization, PFRA grazing lands, drought payments to livestock producers and 
a Meat Import Law are a few readily available examples. No direct comparisons 
are made between grain programs and livestock programs as this is beyond the 
scope of the paper. 
356 

Government to assist farmers through difficult periods of drought and poor 
prices, respectively. In common with two previous major relief programs, Lower 
Inventory for Tomorrow (LIFT, 1970) program and the Wheat Acreage Reduction (WAR, 
1941), CCDAP and SCGP rewarded late adjusters and were indifferent to, or even 
penalized, early adjusters. 4 The Permanent Cover Program (PCP) of the 1989 
Canada-Saskatchewan Agreement on Soil Conservation will also reward those who 
have delayed their adjustment, this time to the long-term environmental problem 
of "soil deterioration on high risk lands presently in annual cultivation."5 
The above five agricultural programs are analyzed for their implications 
for early and late adjusters. Each program was ad hoc, introduced as a temporary 
measure in response to a period of distress (primarily in Prairie agriculture) 
caused by either poor market or environmental conditions. Just as some farmers 
were late adjusters to the problems, the programs themselves, by targeting the 
health of the grain export economy, may have been late and inappropriate 
government interventions in a longer term framework. Throughout the coming and 
going of these ad hoc programs, the delivery quota system has, in its various 
forms, been a major determinant of how producers adjust to market and 
environmental signals in their land use and methods of farming. 
After reviewing the ad hoc programs, it is obvious they were largely 
directed to the Prairie grain export community and, in many ways, are consistent 
with 20th century Prairie land use based on the Homestead Act, the Land Survey, 
the Crow Rate/Western Grain Transportation Act and other major ongoing federal 
agricultural policies. This paper goes on to briefly review these fundamental 
programs, and the land assessment and property taxation system of Saskatchewan. 
It asks the basic question: Are cereal grain exports the long-run comparative 
advantage of Saskatchewan from an economic and an environmental perspective? 
To be more direct, what are the long-run economics and environmental implications 
of maintaining a monoculture system to produce a product worth 6 cents a pound 
which must be moved halfway around the world to reach markets? 
Part I of the paper reviews the ad hoc programs and the delivery quota 
system. Part II examines some historical and ongoing programs which support 
current land use practices underlying the wheat-for-export economy, and asks if 
these programs are economically or environmentally sustainable. Has policy 
intervention been part of the solution or part of the problem? The paper 
concludes with suggestions for future policies and programs. 
4Late adjusters, for the purposes of this paper, include those farmers who 
continue to grow crops or use agronomic practices that contribute to recognized 
agricultural problems. They are hesitant to change their crop mix or methods 
of farming in response to market or environmental signals. Instead, they usually 
wait for the government to give them the lead through various programs and 
payments. Early adjusters are farmers who perceive problems either in markets 
or the physical environment, and respond by altering their enterprises or by 
changing their agronomic practices. Their operations change independently of 
anticipated assistance from government programs. 
5PFRA Brochure. Agreement on Soil Conservation: Permanent Cover Program, 
1989' p. 1. 
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I. Ad Hoc Programs 
A. Wheat Acreage Reduction (WAR) 1941 
A combination of generally good wheat crops and low demand worldwide 
created a large international surplus of wheat during the late 1930's. Canada, 
however, experienced extremely poor wheat yields in this period. Then, in 1939 
and 1940, Canada produced very large wheat crops (Table 1). At the same time 
German occupation of much of Europe cut off most of Canada's major wheat markets. 
The net effect was a buildup of stocks in Canada (Table 2). 
The Canadian government introduced two major programs in response to this 
situation. The first initiative, in the fall of 1940, was the introduction of 
delivery quotas to regulate the flow of grain to market. This program is briefly 
examined to illustrate a policy that did not unduly benefit late adjusters. 6 
Quota acres were established on the basis of 1940 seeded acres. Wheat, 
oats and barley were the only crops under quota, and quota delivery privileges 
were not interchangeable between crops or between producers. Initial quotas 
for the grains were set at five bushels per seeded acre. Perhaps inadvertently, 
· wheat was given preferential treatment because a bushel of wheat is worth more 
than a bushel of oats or barley, ·so the wheat quota was much more valuable. The 
result was, if 100 acres were seeded to each crop, the 500 bushels of wheat 
quota was worth $265, oats $105 and barley $135. 7 Quotas were lifted because of 
rising demand soon after the crop year began. 
In the second year, 1941-42, an effort was made to discourage wheat 
production and increase coarse grain production through the manner in which the 
quotas were set up. The delivery base for wheat, called the Authorized Wheat 
Area, was 65 percent of an individual producer's 1940 wheat acreage. Adjustments 
were made for producers who had either an abnormally high or low, proportion of 
their farms in wheat in 1940. 8 The calculation of quota acres for 1941 gave some 
advantage to those farmers who grew only a few acres of wheat in 1940 and lightly 
6The Diefenbaker acreage payment program (1958-60) which paid a flat payment 
of $1 per cultivated acre to farmers may not have unduly benefitted late 
adjusters. It did tend to reward low quality land and areas where summerfallow 
was an important: agronomic practice. However, it was neutral to choice of crops. 
The Two Price Wheat Program also made acreage payments for a short period in the 
early 1970's. 
7The average farm prices for spring wheat, oats and barley were 53 cents, 
21 cents and 27 cents per bushel respectively in 1940-41 in Saskatchewan. 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 22-002. Quarterly Bulletin of Agricultural 
Statistics, January- March, 1942, Table 1, p. 23). 
8Charles F. Wilson, Grain Marketing in Canada, 1979, page 233. 
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Table 1: World and Canadian Wheat Production, 1927-42 
Year 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
All Commercially 
Producing Countries Canada 
---------------Bushels------------
4,509,106,477 
4,845,026,484 
4,295,927,295 
4,851,582,431 
5,420,370,256 
5,473,164,275 
5,704,331,430 
5,499,013,561 
5,565,863,749 
5,598,244,699 
6,152,343,327 
6,724,570,000 
6,279,270,000 
479,665,000 
566,726,000 
304,520,000 
420,672,000 
321,325,000 
443,061,000 
281,892,000 
275,849,000 
281,935,000 
219,218,000 
180,210,000 
360,010,000 
520,623,000 
540,190,000 
314,825,000 
556,684,000 
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 22-201, Report on the Grain 
Trade of Canada. 1931-1943. Table: 8 Wheat Production by 
Countries" various pages, Table: Acreage, Yield and 
Production in Canada8 , various pages. 
Table 2: Total Carryover of Canadian Wheat in Canada 
and the United States, 1935-1942. 
August 1, 1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
--Bushels--
213,852,118 
127,362,598 
36,850,700 
24,535,858 
102,161,568 
300,473,465 
480,129,311 
423,752,337 
Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS), 22-201, Report of Grain 
Trade of Canada, 1942-43, p. 38, 
DBS, Monthly Review of the Wheat Situation, Vol. 12, No. 12, 
August 21, 1942, p. 32. 
359 
penalized farmers who sowed ~ 'large acreage tb ~heat in 1940. 9 This adjustment 
provision for revising abnormally high acreages downwards in the calculation of 
the Authorized Wheat Area appears to have been some reward for early adjusters 
and some penalty for late adjusters. 
The second initiative, in the crop year 1941-42, was the Wheat Acreage 
Reduction program. This program paid farmers a specified amount per acre to 
switch land from wheat to summerfallow, coarse grains or grass. The payment 
was made on the reduction of wheat acres in 1941 from wheat acres sown in 1939 
or 1940. Again adjustments were made if wheat acres were unusually high or low 
in 1940. 
To illustrate the payment mechanism, three hypothetical farms with the 
same amount of acres (600 acres cultivated, 100 acres pasture) but a different 
crop mix, are analyzed in Table 3. Farmer A practised a 50-50 wheat-fallow 
rotation in 1939. In 1940, good soil moisture levels encouraged him to plant 
two-thirds of his cultivated land to wheat. Farmer B grew large acreages of 
wheat in both 1939 and 1940. He even broke 100 acres of pasture in 1940 in 
preparation for planting wheat. Farmer C saw, in the spring of 1939, the wheat 
carryover building up and decided not to grow much wheat, but to concentrate on 
other crops. In 1940, he saw a further buildup of wheat stocks and decided not 
to grow wheat at all. 
In 1941, all three farmers decided to take one-half of their 1940 computed 
wheat acreage out of production and put it into summerfallow. There was a 
payment of $4 for each acre transferred from wheat to summerfallow. Only $2/acre 
was immediately paid for wheat acres switched to coarse grains or grass, with 
another $2 paid if the land was still in coarse grains or grass in July, 1942. 
As illustrated by the above example, farmers who contributed to the wheat 
glut by sowing most of their acres to wheat in 1939 and 1940 were rewarded by 
the government more than farmers who diversified their crop base in 1939 and 
1940. It paid to maximize wheat production prior to the Canadian implementation 
of the Wheat Acreage Reduction program. Farmer B received a $1,120 payment and 
Farmer A received a $720 payment, while the early adjuster, Farmer C, received 
only $200. 10 
9Adjustments were made for those producers who grew large acreages of wheat 
in 1940, by comparing their wheat acreage to those of other farmers in their 
district. If their acreage was abnormally high it was adjusted downwards. For 
those producers who grew little or no wheat in 1940, the Authorized Wheat Area 
was increased on an individual basis. We were unable to calculate exact 
adjustments because the information was unavailable in the sources we used 
(Canadian Wheat Board Circulars 195, April 28, 1941 and 200, April 3, 1941). 
10This example may not be indicative of the mix of crops grown on the 
Prairies during this period. It is chosen to illustrate the weakness of the 
program. 
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Table 3: Three Calculations of Wheat Acreage Reduction Payments (WAR, 1941) 
------------------------Acres------------------------------
Farmer A: 
Actual 1939 Actual 1940 Computed 
Wheat 300 400 3601 
Coarse Grains 
Summerfallow 300 200 240 
Total Cultivated 600 600 600 
Pasture 100 100 100 
Total 700 700 700 
Calculation for WAR: 
1/2 of computed 1940 wheat acreage taken out of production 
WAR - 180 acres 
180 x $4.00/acre - $720.00 
Farmer B: 
1940 
Actual 1939 Actual 1940 Computed 1940 
Wheat 
Coarse Grains 
Summerfallow 
Total Cultivated 
Pasture 
Total 
soo 
0 
100 
600 
100 
700 
S002 
0 
100 
600 
100 (Broken) 5 
700 
S603 
205 
1204 
700 
__ o
700 
1/2 of computed 1940 wheat acreage taken out of production 
WAR - 280 acres 
280 x $4.00/acre - $1,120.00 
Farmer c· . 
Actual 1939 Actual 1940 Computed 1940 
Wheat 100 0 1006 
Coarse Grains 200 300 2SO 
Summerfallow 300 300 .2.iQ 
Total Cultivated 600 600 600 
Pasture 100 100 100 
Total 700 700 700 
1/2 of computed 1940 wheat acreage taken out of production 
WAR - SO acres 
SO x $4.00/acre - $200.00 
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Actual 1941 
180 
420 
600 
100 
700 
Actual 1941 
280 
20 
400 
700 
__Q 
700 
Actual 1941 
so 
2SO 
300 
600 
100 
700 
Continued 
Table 3: Continued 
1 The 1940 computed wheat acreage from which the wheat acreage reduction was 
calculated was the average of the 1939 and 1940 wheat acreages. If that average 
fell below 60% of 1940 cultivated acres (as in Farm A above), the larger of the 
wheat acreages in 1939 and 1940 was used up to 60% of 1940 cultivated acres. 
2 In 1940 there was a record wheat acreage in the Prairie Provinces. Some 
individual farmers planted abnormally large acreages. 
3 Any farmer who had 80% or more of cultivated acreage in wheat in 1939 and 1940 
could claim 80% of 1940 cultivated acreage as computed 1940 wheat acreage (480 
acres in this case). As explained in (5) below, 80% of newly broken land was 
then added to this wheat acreage (480 + 80- 560). 
4 The computed 1940 summerfallow and coarse grains acreages had to be increased 
or decreased in the proportion they were actually grown in 1940 by the decrease 
or increase in computed 1940 wheat acreage over actual 1940 wheat acreage. 
5 Any land newly broken in 1940 had 80% included in computed 1940 wheat acreage 
and 20% included in 1940 computed coarse grain acreage. 
6 Because Farmer C grew no wheat in 1940, he was allowed to use his 1939 wheat 
acreage as his computed 1940 wheat acreage, up to 60% of 1940 total cultivated 
acres. 
Source: The examples and notes are developed from the authors' interpretation 
of Order in Council, P.C. 3047, "Payments in Respect of Wheat Acreage 
Reduction", The Canada Gazette, October 18, 1941, pp. 1248 - 1251. 
A further monetary benefit to wheat farmers at this time was the Canadian 
Wheat Board's (CWB) Farm Storage Payment Program. During the periods from 
October 8, 1940 to July 31, 1941 and from October 8, 1941 to July 31, 1942, the 
CWB paid farmers 1/45 of a cent/bushel/day for the cost of storing wheat on the 
farm. This payment was for all grades of wheat delivered between November 1 and 
July 31 of each of the above crop years. The CWB paid farmers $6,796,174 during 
the duration of this program. 11 As a reference point, cumulative realized net 
farm income in the three Prairie provinces in 1941 and 1942 was about 
$500,000,000. 12 
11Canadian Wheat Board, Annual Reports, 1940-41, p. 9 and 1941-42, p. 6. 
12 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 21-502, Handbook of A~ricultural 
Statistics, Part II, 1926-57, pp. 32- 34. 
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B. Lower Inventory for Tomorrow (LIFT) 1970 
Surplus wheat stocks occurred again on the Prairies in the late 1960's 
(Table 4). In response to this situation, the federal government, in 1970, 
introduced Operation LIFT (Lower Inventory for Tomorrow). 
Under the LIFT program a payment was made to every permit book holder who 
reduced wheat acreage in 1970 from wheat acreage sown in 1969. A producer 
received the full acreage payment if he had "increased the sum of his 
summerfallow and perennial forage acreage by an amount equal to that removed from 
wheat." 13 There were special provisions made for those farmers who grew 
Table 4: Total Carryover of Canadian Wheat in Canada 
and the U.S., 1966-72. 
July 31, 1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Bushels 
420,122,308 
571,750,535 
672,509,981 
851,828,399 
1,008,690,000 
734,154,000 
583,757,000 
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 22-201, 
Report of the Grain Trade of Canada, 1972-73, p. 81. 
less than 100 acres of wheat or had an excess number of acres in summerfallow 
(more than 50% of cultivated land) in 1969. Farmers were paid $6.00/acre if 
wheat acres were put into summerfallow or perennial forage with a further $4.00 
paid per acre of new perennial forage if it remained planted in July, 1971. 
Each producer could withdraw wheat acres up to a maximum of 1000 acres. 
Three hypothetical farms are again examined to illustrate the payment 
mechanism. Table 5 shows the cropping changes made by each farmer under LIFT 
and calculates each LIFT payment. Farmer A decided to plant a large proportion 
of his farm's cultivated acres to wheat in 1969. Farmer Band C saw the buildup 
of wheat stocks and decided to grow only a few acres of wheat in 1969. They 
switched acreage from wheat to either summerfallow or coarse grains and oilseeds .. 
Farmer A, who continued to contribute to the evident wheat surplus by 
planting a large acreage of wheat in 1969, received the largest government 
13Canadian Department of Agriculture, Canada Agriculture, Spring 1970, page 
1 of insert. 
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Table 5: Three Calculations of LIFT Payments (1970) 
-----------------------Acres-------------------------------
Farmer A Farmer B Farmer C 
For Lift 
Actual Purposes 
1969 1970 1969 1969 1970 1969 1970 
Wheat 1500 500 100 3001 0 100 0 
Coarse Grains 
and Oilseeds 700 700 700 1100 1100 
Summ.erfallow 500 1400 1200 1000 10002 800 800 
Perennial 
Forage 100 300 100 
Total Acres 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Farmer A - 1000 acre reduction in wheat 
900 acre increase in summerfallow x $6.00/acre - $5,400 
100 acre increase in perennial forage x $10.00/acre $1.000 
Total $6,400 
Farmer B - 300 acre reduction in wheat 
300 acre increase in perennial forage X $10.00/acre - $3,000 
Farmer C - 100 acre reduction in wheat 
100 acre increase in perennial forage x $10.00/acre - $1,000 
1 If a producer in 1969 summerfallowed more than 50% of his cultivated acres, 
the excess summerfallow acres (above 50%) were considered 1969 wheat acres. 
Wheat acres were increased by that amount (200 acres for Farm B above) and 
summerfallow acres decreased by that amount, for the purpose of the LIFT 
payment calculation. 
2 According to the LIFT calculations, Farmer B summerfallowed 1000 acres in 
1969 and 1970 (SO% of his cultivated acres each year). In reality, he had 
excess summerfallow in 1969 as an adjustment to the wheat surplus and was 
forced to double summerfallow some land in 1970 (200 acres in this case) to 
receive the full LIFT payment. This is usually not considered a desirable 
agronomic practice, but could and did happen in some cases. The principal 
author has personal knowledge of producers who did double summerfallow. LIFT 
was designed to discourage wheat farmers from moving into coarse grains and 
oilseeds (to prevent instability in those markets) and to increase acreage in 
summerfallow and perennial forage. (See "Operation Lift" Statement by the 
Honourable Otto E. Lang to the House of Commons, February 27, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
Source: The examples and notes are developed from the authors' interpretation 
of Appropriation Act No. 1, 1970, "Wheat Inventory Reduction 
Regulations", The Canada Gazette, Part II, May 13, 1970, pp. 467-470. 
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payment because he was able to withdraw the maximum 1000 acres from wheat 
production. It is interesting to note that Farmer A could have increased his 
LIFT payment if he had been willing to plant more perennial forage. However, 
the full $10 payment per acre for perennial forage was conditional on keeping 
it in forage until July 15, 1971. Farmers B and C were penalized by LIFT for 
their attempts to deal on an individual basis with the wheat glut by 
diversifying. 
A new quota policy partially offset the bias of the payment system used 
in the LIFT program. Any acres seeded to wheat in 1970 did not qualify for 
quota. Quota acres assignable to wheat in 1970 were equal to the number of acres 
in summerfallow in 1970, the net increase in perennial forage crops in 1970 over 
1969, plus 25 percent of the acres in summerfallow in 1969. 14 As a result, 
Farmer A had 1,625 quota acres, Farmer B 1,600 quota acres and Farmer C, 1,100 
quota acres available for assignment to wheat deliveries. For crops other than 
wheat, farmers received the actual acreage seeded to each crop as their quota 
delivery base for that crop.· Farmers B and C, respectively, had totals of 700 
and 1,100 quota acres for coarse grains and oi1seeds. In addition, all three 
farmers could use their assignable quota acres for wheat deliveries or to 
increase the delivery of any other quota grain. 
C. Special Canadian Grains Program (SCGP) 1986 
In 1986, the federal government agreed to pay a one billion dollar 
deficiency payment to grain farmers across Canada. This program was initiated 
in response to low grain prices caused by the subsidy war, primarily in wheat, 
between the European Community (EC) and the United States. There have been a 
number of criticisms of the program, but this paper will only consider the 
failure to include a broader range of crops in the initial year. 15 
SCGP was announced as a one time payment in December, 1986. Subsequently 
the program was extended and enlarged in 1987. Initially only certain crops were 
included. They were wheat (including durum), oats, barley, rapeseed, rye, flax, 
corn, soybeans, mixed grains and sunflowers. Lentils, peas, mustard, canaryseed 
and other special crops were excluded. The payment was ncalculated on the basis 
of farmers' seeded acreage of grains and oilseeds, and on representative regional 
yields derived from crop insurance data. Assistance rates for each commodity 
are proportional to their relative price decline attributable to the trade 
14 The formula also included only a 25 percent factor for newly broken land, 
and a reduction in assignable quota acres if perennial forage was broken up. 
However, neither of these factors apply to the selected examples provided. 
(Wilson, p. 241 and 242). 
15A second problem with SCGP was the use of regional average yields to 
calculate SCGP payments. This averaging of yield generated an income transfer 
from producers with high-quality cultivated land to producers with low-quality 
cultivated land. This is further explained in the next section of the paper. 
The income transfer mechanism which favours the cultivation of marginal land is 
essentially the same for both SCGP and CCDAP. 
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war. "16 The payment to each fafmer wa,s limited to $25,000. 
Two hypothetical farms with the same number of cultivated acres and in 
the same crop insurance area are analyzed to illustrate the payment mechanism. 
Farmer A had tried to diversify his crop mix over the previous few years by 
planting a large number of acres to special crops. Farmer B continued to seed 
the traditional crops. Their cropping mix and the calculation of the payment 
from the government for 1986 is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Two Calculations of SCGP Payments (1986) 
(1a) (lb) (2) (3) 
Farmer A Farmer B Regional Yield SCGP Assistance 
Rate 
(acres) (acres) (bujacre) ($/bu.) 
Wheat 600 1200 30 .4629 
Barley 300 42 .2674 
Lentils 300 
Peas 200 
Canaryseed 400 
Summerfallow 500 500 
Total 
Cultivated 2000 2000 
'" 
Payment Formula - Column 1 X Column 2 X Column 3 - SCGP payment 
Farmer A - 600 x 30 x $.4629 - $ 8,332.20 
Farmer B - 1200 x 30 x $.4629 - $16,664.40 
· 300 X 42 X $.2674 - $ 3,369.24 
$20,033.64 
Source: Examples developed from the authors' interpretation of various 
Agriculture Canada printed materials on the Special Canadian Grains Program. 
Results from Table 6 show that Farmer A received about $8,332 and Farmer 
B received about $20,034 from the government. Farmer A, who tried to reduce 
his acreage of traditional crops, received less money for being innovative. 
Farmer B stayed with the traditional crops and was rewarded handsomely. One 
16Agriculture Canada, Communication Branch News Release, Special Canadian 
Grains Program, Ottawa: December 9, 1986, p. 2. 
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might argue that special crop prices were not affected by the trade war, and if 
special crop producers in Western Canada were to be rewarded, all special crop 
producers in Canada, including potato farmers in Prince Edward Island, should 
have been paid. However, special crop prices in Western Canada were affected 
by the trade war. As international prices for traditional grains dropped, 
farmers seeded more acres to special crops, thus driving down their price. The 
substitutability of the input mix and the specialized machinery enables an easy 
shift from wheat to canaryseed or mustard. Growing potatoes, on the other hand, 
requires a different implement mix. 
To be fair to the designers of the SCGP, special crops including mustard, 
dry peas, lentils, canaryseed, safflower, buckwheat, fababeans, triticale and 
dry beans were included in the second year of the program. It was recognized 
by then that the trade war was affecting more than traditional grain and oilseed 
producers. 
D. Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program (CCDAP) 1988 
CCDAP was a response to a different set of problems than the three 
programs discussed above. Instead of addressing market difficulties facing 
Prairie farmers, CCDAP was a drought relief program. Despite the apparently 
straightforward rationale for this program, the assistance was skewed in favour 
of farmers who cultivated the lowest quality land in drought-affected townships 
and those who ignored the low soil moisture levels in the spring of 1988, and 
planted "as usual". 
CCDAP made crop-specific acreage payments which took into account crop 
losses from drought, normal yields, 1988-89 farmgate prices, and crop insurance 
support, all at the township level. 17 Table 7 examines the hypothetical cases 
of two farmers in the same township who received payments based on township 
average data, compared to the payments they might have received if individual 
farm data were used for target revenues, actual yields, crop insurance payments 
received and farmgate prices. 
The method of paying on township averages generated a transfer payment 
from farmers with good land to farmers with poor land, under most reasonable sets 
of relative yield assumptions. In the example shown, Farmer A, who had high 
long-term average yields, received the same CCDAP payments per acre as Farmer 
B who, historically, had a much lower long-term average yield. If individual 
data had been used to determine the payments, Farmer A would have received a 
higher payment per acre. 
Table 8 calculates the gross returns of two farmers on land of different 
quality within a township. The example assumes only two farmers of equal acreage 
occupy the township. Farmer A is on higher quality land with a 30 bu. per acre 
long term average wheat yield. Farmer B, on lower quality land, has a 20 bu. 
per acre long term yield. · Both are assumed to be at the entry level of crop 
17Agriculture Canada, Agriculture Development Branch, various printed 
materials distributed to Rural Municipality Administrators, 1989. 
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Table 7: The Calculation of CCDAP Payments (1988) 
Long-term Average 
Yield (wheat bu./acre) 
1988 Farmgate Price 
(wheat, $/bu.) 
a) Target Revenuesjacre1 
1988 average yield 
(bu./acre) 
b) Market Returns/acre2 
Actual Payments 
Farmer A and B 
Based on Township 
Averages 
25 
$4.35 
.7775x25x4.35 
= $84.55 
7 
7x$4.35 
=$30.45 
1988 crop insurance value 
(wheat $/bu.) 
c) Crop Insurance3 
Returns/acre 
d) CCDAP 1~aymentjacre 
a-b-e-d 
e) Total CCDAP Payment if 
700 cropped acres/farm 
$2.99 
[.7(25)-7]x$2.99 
= $31.40 
Actual 
$22.70/acre 
$15,890.00 
Hypothetical Payments if 
Individual Data Used 
Farmer A 
30 
$4.35 
.7775x30x4.35 
-$101.46 
8 
8x$4.35 
-$34.80 
$2.99 
[.7(30)-8]x2.99 
-$38.87 
Farmer B 
20 
$4.35 
. 7775x20x4. 35 
-$67.64 
6 
6x$4.35 
-$26.10 
$2.99 
[.7(20)-6]x2.99 
-$23.92 
If based on individual data 
$27.79/acre $17.62/acre 
$19,453.00 $12,334.00 
1 Target Revenues/acre equal 77 3/4 percent of long-term average yield x 
farmgate price. 
2 Market Returns/acre equal 1988 average yield x farmgate price. 
3 Crop Insurance Returns/acre equal [(70 percent of long term average yield) -
1988 average yield] x 1988 crop insurance value/bushel. 
Source: Developed from the authors' interpretation of various Agriculture 
Canada printed materials on the Canadian Crop Drought Assistance 
Program. 
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Table 8: A Simplified Comparison of Gross Farmer Returns Under Alternative Yield 
Assumptions Including CCDAP Payments in 1988. 1 
FARMER A2 
Yield (bu/acre) 6 7 9 11 12 
Market Returns/acre3 26.10 30.45 39.15 47.85 52.20 
Crop Insurance4 44.85 41.86 35.88 29.90 26.91 
CCDAP Payment2 22.70 22.70 22.70 22.70 22.70 
A. Gross Returns 93.65 95.01 97.73 100.45 101.81 
FARMER B2 
Yield (bujacre) 8 7 5 3 2 
Market Returns/acre3 34.80 30.45 21.75 13.05 8.70 
Crop Insurance4 17.94 20.93 26.91 32.89 35.88 
CCDAP Payment2 22.70 22.70 22.70 22.70 22.70 
B. Gross Returns 75.44 74.08 71.36 68.64 67.28 
B as a Percent of A 80.56 77.97 73.02 68.33 66.08 
1The assumptions are Farmer A and Farmer B have a cropped acreage of equal size 
and are in the same township. Both crop wheat only on a half-half rotation. 
Farmer A has class B, C, and D soils and a long-term rated crop insurance yield 
for the farm of 30.0 bushels per acre. Farmer B has class L and M soils and 
a long-term rated crop insurance yield for the farm of 20.0 bushels per acre. 
Both are good managers and achieve yields identical to the crop insurance rated 
yield. These land ratings are from risk area 12, 1988. 
2This table complements Table 7 and provides alternative yields on Farm A and 
Farm B to generate an average township yield of 7 bushels/acre. The CCDAP 
payment from Table 7 is $22.70/acre for both farms. 
3Market Returns/acre equal 1988 average yield and farmgate price ($4.35/bushel). 
4Crop Insurance Returns/acre equal [(70 percent of long-term average yield) -
1988. average yield] x 1988 crop insurance value/bushel ($2.99/bushel). 
Sources: Developed from the authors' interpretation of various Agriculture 
Canada printed materials on the Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program; 
and Agriculture Canada and Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation. 
Canada/Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Premium Tables, 1988. 
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insurance coverage (i.e. no coverage adjustment for either farmer). Both 
are assumed to have equal management skills. Based on long term average 
yields, the gross income of Farfuer B is expected to be 66.67 percent c)f the gross 
income of Farmer A (20 bu./acre yield vs 30 bu./acre yield). The yield 
distributions in the township are examined at different levels, with Farmer A's 
yields ranging from 6 bu. to 12 bu./acre. Consequently, Farmer B's yields range 
from 8 bu. to 2 bu./acre so the township average yield remains at 7 bushels per 
acre. Farmer B receives more than 66.67 percent of the gross retun1s of Farmer 
A for all the relative yields, except where Farmer A produces 12 bu./acre and 
Farmer B, 2 bu./acre. With the relative yields of 12 bushels for l~armer A and 
2 bushels for Farmer B, Farmer B would not be required to combine the crop, while 
Farmer A would have harvesting expenses. Therefore, under any conceivable yield 
alternatives, Farmer A does not achieve his historical relative advantage in 
long-term gross income when compared to Farmer B. This is due to the nature of 
the CCDAP program which favoured those producers who cultivated low quality 
marginal land within a township. This program is not consistent with crop 
insurance which seeks to achieve similar proportions of normal yield, such as 
60 percent or 70 percent coverage options. 
It may be inappropriate to credit a producer with being an early adjuster 
based on the quality of his land. However, the farmer who brought marginal land 
into production, and kept it in production in spite of low returns to cropping 
and negative climatic and environmental indications, appears to be a late 
adjuster. CCDAP ensured that marginal land with low long-term avE!rage yields 
. achieved the same target revenue per acre as good land with higher long-term 
average yields if the two parcels were in the same township. The fact that two 
pieces of land are in the same township is a result of the survey system and may 
.... bear little relation to soil type, quality, yield expectation, geography or the 
best long-run use of the land. 
Producers who correctly anticipated a drought based on their spring 
moisture conditions, and took a larger than average percentage of land out of 
production, had to make some extra efforts to secure CCDAP payments for their 
excess summerfallow. They also waited a longer time to receive 1:heir money. 
To be fair to the designers of the program, coverage for excess summerfallow was 
included in the initial program announcement. Other farmers who 1~sed (often) 
marginal land to produce hay and commercial forage seed were denied payments 
under CCDAP. This certainly emphasized the federal government's long-term bias 
toward the annual cultivation of the majority of Prairie land, including the 
marginal land, as the basis of a Western Canadian grain economy. 
E. Permanent Cover Program (PCP) 1989 
The PFRA-administered Permanent Cover Program of the Canada-Saskatchewan 
Agreement on Soil Conservation is the first significant federal government 
program in many years to take large tracts of marginal land out of cultivation 
on the Prairies. Among the programs discussed above, only WAR and LIFT addressed 
the issue of annual cultivation versus perennial crops or grasslands. In both 
of the above programs, "perennial" forage had to remain on the designated acres 
for at least one-and-a-half seasons -- hardly a permanent shift in the use of 
land resources, 
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The Permanent Cover Program provides a direct financial incentive to remove 
marginal lands from cultivation (for a prolonged period) and, as such, is an 
appropriate response to the problem of soil deterioration on high risk lands. 
However, there are some issues surrounding the program that need to be examined. 
To quote from the PFRA brochure: "The purpose of the Permanent Cover 
Program is to reduce soil deterioration on high risk lands presently in annual 
cultivation. These lands are not suited for growing annual crops and should be 
permanently converted to forage and/or tree cover."18 
The identification and proper management of high risk land is an activity 
that the PFRA has been involved in for more than 50 years and most high risk land 
has been identified for many years. However, the PCP will benefit many late 
adjusters to environmental problems who have cultivated unsuitable land in recent 
years. The extreme example would be the farmer who broke marginal land in the 
spring of 1987 (the latest allowed under the PCP), despite the variable weather 
and grain market conditions of the mid-1980's. Those who may have converted 
their marginal land to environmentally-suitable uses on their own initiative in 
past years, or did not break it at all, will receive no benefit under the PCP 
program. 19 
In addition, the time periods referred to as permanent (10 years or 21 
years) under the PCP do not approach permanency or even, perhaps, the long-
term. It is possible that late adjusters will again receive benefits from 
government programs in 15 to 25 years as the marginal land which entered PCP is 
returned to cultivation. 
Of course, the PFRA cannot necessarily be faulted for the inadequacies of 
the PCP. Many PFRA programs of the past have been inadequately funded or 
neglected due to good weather or attractive grain prices (shelterbelt planting 
for example). The ad hoc nature and relatively small funding level of the PCP 
are the major factors that reduce the prospects for long-term impact on the 
Prairie agricultural industry and the environment. The program is only in place 
for three years and there is no assurance that it will be renewed. This program 
appears to be underfunded as it was oversubscribed within the first few months 
of operation. 
A comparison of another ongoing federal program (W'GTA) with the PCP 
indicates their relative magnitudes. Table 9 illustrates the federal government 
payments made to the railroads for grain transportation under the W'GTA for 1984-
87. Similar payments under W'GTA continue to be made annually. The Permanent 
Cover Program, in contrast to the dollar figures in Table 9, totals (over three 
18PFRA brochure. Agreement on Soil Conservation: Permanent Cover Program. 
1989' p. 1. 
19As one author commented, "Thank God for the cowboys!" 
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Table 9: Yearly Western Grain Transportation Act Payments 
Made by the Canadian Transport Commission to the 
Railroads, 1984-87 Calendar Year in Canadian Dollars 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
TOTAL 
Payment 
589,775,786.60 
496,019,162.47 
671,135,837.88 
942,061,143.02 
2,698,986,940.97 
Source: 1984-86 Data, Canadian Transport Commission Annual Reports, 
1984-86. 
1987 Data, Conversation with Len Hennessey of the 
Canadian Transport Commission (Ottawa), January, 1988. 
Compiled originally for a study of the opportunities and constraints to wheat 
processing in Saskatchewan prepared for Agriculture Canada and Saskatchewan 
Agriculture, (Ken Rosaasen and Ron Eley portion). 
years) about 20.6 million dollars for the Prairie provinces. 20 If another 29.6 
million dollars (approximately) in federal money is added to this amount for 
various other conservation programs administered by PFRA, such as Save Our Soils 
in Saskatchewan and the Manitoba On-Farm Program, the total is still only about 
50.2 million dollars over three years. 21 The significance of ongoing programs 
such as WGTA, which subsidizes the transportation .of grain by rail from the 
Prairies, in determining the direction of Western Canadian agricultural 
development is obvious. The late adjusters, as defined by this paper, have been 
responding appropriately in a short term economic sense if the most powerful 
signals given them arise from government regulations. Market signals have been 
muzzled. 
F. Delivety Quota System 
The use of a delivery quota system for grains since 1940 has had a profound 
effect on the development of Western Canadian agriculture. Quota policy 
originally limited grain delivery per cultivated and/or seeded acr4a of land in 
20Saskatchewan, $10.5 million; Alberta, $8.2 million; and Manitoba, $1.9 
million (the Manitoba amount is an estimate, since it is combined with another 
payment). PFRA, Regina. 
21Conversations with PFRA officials, February, 1990. 
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an attempt to offer equitable delivery opportunities to all producers. As the 
system has evolved, this objective has at times remained primary. At other 
times, coordinating throughput to increase transport and handling capacity has 
been a dominant objective of the Canadian 'Wheat Board in administering the 
delivery quota system. 22 
For producers, the quota policy has been an incentive to increase the 
number of cultivated acres, since access to more delivery opportunities has 
remained their major quota concern. Marginal land has been brought into 
production, and technology has been adopted that permits extensive rather than 
intensive land use. The quota policy has not been conducive to increased land 
productivity. 23 
Producers have not been encouraged to diversify their crop mix since they 
need to keep a high level of quota grain acres to receive adequate delivery quota 
in some years. During most of the 1970's, the quota system allowed equal 
delivery opportunities for each quota acre of a specific crop, regardless of land 
quality and, therefore, provided a transfer from owners of high quality land to 
owners of low quality land. Farmers could not afford to withdraw their marginal 
or high risk land from quota grain production. In the early 1980's, the bonus 
acreage provision of the quota system encouraged continuous annual cropping of 
the traditional crops and reduced the attractiveness of specialty crops or 
perennial forage in the rotation. 24 - Farmers are generally logical in their 
response to the combined results of market signals plus policy or program 
signals. The end result has been the annual cultivation of land to produce 
cereals for export from the region. 
II. Lons-Term Policies: Their Current Direction and Sussestions 
for Future Chanse 
The programs and policies examined in Part I do not appear to have achieved 
a stable or sustainable agricultural economy in Western Canada. Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba, in particular, have great difficulty in supporting a viable rural 
infrastructure. An array of ad hoc programs has been administered, like a series 
of blood transfusions, to a patient pale with financial malaise, at frequent 
intervals over the past decades. These major programs appear to have rewarded 
those who cultivate land, especially those who produce wheat or other traditional 
22n1970 Report on the Delivery Quota Systemn, Wilson, p. 238. 
23 The late adjustment has not taken place exclusively at the producer 
level. Research has tended to support an extensive agriculture which produces 
export crops. Researchers have accomplished much less in the areas of intensive 
production of crops and development of new crops, than in the area of mechanical 
technology which facilitates the substitution of land for labour. See W.H. 
Furtan and George E. Lee. nEconomic Development of the Saskatchewan 'Wheat 
Economy. n Canadian Journal of Asricul tural Economics, Vol. 25, No. 3, November, 
1977, pp. 15-27. 
24Saskatchewan Agriculture. Guide to Farm Practice. 1984, p. 32-33. 
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crops for export and often those who cultivate, ,marginal land. This direction 
of development has been an integral part of Prairie history, its settlement 
pattern, and the upbringing of members of the farming community. Indeed, it was 
in Australia that the principal author first understood the significance of this, 
when he heard a grazier exclaim, "Look at that lovely paddock! "25 A puzzled 
Rosaasen looked in all directions expecting to find a wheat field in the 
distance, but no - the grazier was pointing to his green grass with a few 
eucalyptus trees on it! Suddenly, the Prairie farm boy (author) recognized the 
paradigm from within which he viewed agriculture. His implicit assumption had 
been that land had to be cultivated almost annually to be useful, even though 
he had grown up on a dairy farm. 26 
A. Historical Policies 
The Prairies developed as a wheat export economy because of a number of 
technological and political developments in the 19th century. The repeal of the 
Corn Laws ended a period in which Britain discouraged grain imports. Steamships 
replaced sailing vessels and ocean freight rates were cut to less than one-
fifth of their former values. Steel milling replaced stone grinding, encouraging 
the production of hard wheats. Finally, the railway was built ac:ross Canada 
employing a new technology to secure a political dream of a nation from sea to 
sea and implement the Canadian National Policy. These were all major factors 
that contributed to the growth and development of wheat production and the export 
of wheat from the Prairie region. This direction of development was 
institutionalized in the homestead policy, the legal land survey and the Crow's 
Nest Pass Agreement. 
One perhaps should ask a simple question: "What if the leg:lslators and 
lawyers were wrong with their homestead policy for Western Canada?" The 
homestead policy provided a quarter section of virtually free land if the settler 
"proved up" by clearing and breaking a portion of the land. Given that economies 
of scale exist, once the settler had an ox or a horse and a plough, it became 
relatively cheap to clear and break a few more acres. What if settlers had been 
required to dig a well and fence their land? What if they could have either 
cultivated the land or grazed livestock? How would that have changed the way 
in which Western Canada evolved? 
The legal land survey system in Western Canada is another major regulation 
which has influenced land use and the economics of various enterprises. Land 
was surveyed using a block system of 160 acre quarter sections, 011e half mile 
by one half mile. Road allowances were provided for every one mile moving north 
and south and every two miles running east and west in Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
25Some of the anecdotes in this section of the paper come from the personal 
experience and knowledge of the principal author, Ken Rosaasen. 
260n the Rosaasen dairy farm, when visitors arrived they were proudly shown 
the cattle, the dairy barn and the wheat fields. Occasionally the alfalfa hay 
would be surveyed and the yield estimated, but native prairie and bush were not 
recognized as a vital and prestigious part of the enterprise. 
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This survey system takes no account of land use or land potential, quite unlike 
the systems of Europe where the legal system is subservient to the land use 
(farmers in Germany own a number of rows of grapes within a vineyard on a 
hillside). Placing the legal system above the uses of the land, as Canada did 
on the Prairies, indicated an attitude of human mastery over the land and the 
environment. This was the framework within which the land would be owned and 
utilized in the decades that followed. 
Wheat has been King on the Prairies and especially in Saskatchewan. Will 
it remain so? Are the current strengths of the wheat industry from its 
agronomics, its economics, or its politics? Perhaps the paper's introductory 
question should again be raised: What are the long-run economics and 
environmental implications of maintaining a monoculture system to produce a 
product worth six cents a pound which must be moved half way around the world 
to reach markets? 
A wise person once said "Good judgment comes from experience.... and 
experience comes from bad judgment". One of the factors to consider in any new 
program initiative is what has been learned from the past. This paper now 
examines some of the current programs and policies in the light of past 
experience. 
B. Present Ongoing Policies 
The world trade environment is uncertain at the moment and the current 
trade war appears to be in danger of escalating rather than subsiding. Many 
Canadians are hopeful that changes to international trading rules will be the 
tool that improves Canada's access to world markets. In the past, Western 
provinces have asked the Canadian government to pursue a strategy that opens 
markets to their products, both raw and processed. Canada has complained of the 
tariff on canola oil entering Japan and has argued that it forces Canada to 
export raw seed. Western Canada is denied the opportunity for processing and 
value-added which results from the production of edible oil. Similarly, a decade 
or more ago, Canada sought to have the ad valorem duty on boxed beef entering 
the U.S. reduced. Much effort is expended addressing the problems in the 
international arena that discriminate against value-added processing on the 
Prairies. Yet "Made in Canada" policies continue to discriminate against these 
same processing activities within the Prairie region. 
1. The Crow Benefit and the Western Grain Transportation Act 
The payment of the Crow Benefit of approximately 700 million dollars 
annually under the Western Grain Transportation Act is one of the major policy 
variables determining the evolution of Western Canadian agriculture. The method 
of payment debate continues, with some advocating that the transportation subsidy 
be paid to farmers in order to end the discrimination against prairie processing. 
Others defend the current method of pay-the-railways based on the volume of 
eligible grains and distance which they are shipped. Those who advocate a pay-
the-farmer scenario sometimes suggest a payment to farmers based on the actual 
volume of grain shipped over the past five years. This would reward producers 
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who continue to grow wheat and barley and other crops with a high bulk and low 
value. 27 
A pay-the-farmer system based on historical shipments would reduce the 
payments to a producer who fed some livestock. Under the original Crow, all the 
grain that was produced on the Prairies was a recipient of the benefit of Crow 
regulation because of the higher grain price which prevailed on th4e Prairies. 28 
Consider the following hypothetical situation where all of the hogs and 
cattle currently living in the Prairie region were ordered to be slaughtered 
because they were found to be contributing to a contagious human disease. Both 
the former Crow Rate and the current WGTA payment mechanism would allow the grain 
which was formerly fed to these animals to be included in the subsicly mechanism. 
Pasture and hayland could also be diverted to grain production. This situation 
would lead to a dilution of the federal government payment per tonne or a per 
bushel shipped under WGTA. End use of the grain should not be a criterion for 
excluding some producers from a Crow benefit payment. 
The above example demonstrates all the savings to the Canadian taxpayer 
and all of the added benefits to existing Prairie grain exportE~rs to which 
Prairie livestock producers have contributed over the years. These producers 
have not directly collected any Crow subsidy. Similarly, producers of alfalfa 
seed or lentils, which have higher value and a lower weight of output per acre, 
have not received the direct benefit that was available had they shifted to wheat 
or barley production for export. Should these producers be rewarded or punished 
with a revision in the Crow benefit payment mechanism? A Crow benefit payment 
per acre, based on the acre's rated productive capacity through a land 
productivity rating like crop insurance, recognizes that current land use can 
.be altered to produce wheat or traditional crops for exports. To develop a new 
system based on the volume of past shipment or current shipments will only 
replace one distortion with another and may entail high ongoing administration 
costs. 
Two related issues can be raised. First, the policy option of treating 
the railways like highways, in terms of ownership and maintenance of roadbed, 
should receive serious consideration. Second, if the new trend is Dlarket niches 
and service to customers, why should the Canadian Wheat Board be confined by 
legislation and tradition to shipping only two raw products and a few of their 
derivatives? In contrast, the mandate of the Australian Wheat Board was recently 
expanded to include a larger range of commodities for export. If distance to 
market is the major disadvantage of the Prairie region, then why not seek to move 
a more valuable product? 
27Rosaasen admits that the rotation used in his farming operation is almost 
exclusively devoted to wheat, canola and barley. 
28It appears indefensible tq suggest that only grain producers who received 
the direct benefit of lower freight cost through CrowjWGTA should maintain the 
benefit, while those who received the indirect benefit from the hlgher Prairie 
grain price which prevailed should not. 
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2. Land Assessment and Property Taxation 
Perhaps the method of measuring Gross National Product (GNP) or the value 
of all the goods and services produced has contributed to an undervaluation of 
the natural environment and our stock of resources. Economists measure the cash 
flow in the economy in terms of goods and services and capital structures, but 
rarely look at the stock of resources that remain or their condition. An example 
which may clarify this is the story of the farmer who did very well on his rented 
Land Bank land, selling topsoil as garden soil in town! This misuse of resources 
may be obvious to most, but what about the general degradation of crop land 
throughout Saskatchewan? Soil scientists report that the organic matter content 
of some Saskatchewan soils may have declined by as much as SO percent in just 
a few decades. 29 Is the Saskatchewan agricultural economy based on selling our 
top soil? 
The Saskatchewan property taxation system does not punish the farmer when 
his farming practices contribute to soil degradation. Land is assessed based 
on its productivity potential in Saskatchewan and a mill rate is established to 
determine the annual property taxes payable. Assume two farmers have adjoining 
quarter sections which were assessed at one point in time at $2,SOO each. Assume 
that Farmer A was a good manager and maintained the quality of his land, but 
Farmer B employed management practices which resulted in serious erosion by both 
wind and water. Subsequent to a period of inflation, Farmer A's land is assessed 
at $S,400 and Farmer B's land is assessed at $4,800. Farmer A now pays a larger 
property tax as his contribution to roads and education in the municipality, 
based on his higher assessment. 
If an entirely different perspective of the property tax system and good 
management practices were employed, land use might change radically. An organic 
matter index of the soil could be taken. If it increased between assessments, 
property taxes would decline. If organic matter decreased, then property taxes 
would increase. The incentive for the individual should be consistent with the 
societal view of the proper use and management of the land resource. 
C. A Suggestion: Another Special Canadian Grains Program 
There can be alternatives to current policies and programs. Consider a 
Special Canadian Grains Program III for 1990 to promote on-farm experimental 
agriculture. Its purposes would be to address the farm income problem 
precipitated by the trade war in the world wheat market between the U.S. and the 
EC, as SCGP I and SCGP II did, and to expose producers to expanded production 
alternatives. Instead of rewarding only those who grow the traditional crops, 
29The organic matter content of the surface horizon of Prairie soils has 
decreased by about SO percent, but absolute declines based on the whole soil 
profile are probably about lS to 30 percent. See W. B. McGill, J. F. Dormaar,. E. 
Reinl-Dwyer, •New Perspectives on Soil Organic Quality, Quantity and Dynamics 
on the Canadian Prairies•, in Land Degradation and Conseryation Tillage, Partial 
Proceedings of the 34th Annual CSSS/AIC Meetings. Calgary: University of 
Calgary, August, 1988, pp. 30-48. 
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this program would hav~ a very different mandate. It would encourage farmers 
to grow 20 acres of an "exotic crop". An exotic crop would be anything other 
than the six major Prairie crops, and, additional1y, the six major crops delivered 
to each producer's delivery point. 
The SCGP III payment could be a flat rate of $50 or $100 per acre. Small 
acreage intensive crops (e.g. horticultural), capable of providing an estimated 
$3, 500 of gross income could also be eligible for the maximum payout. The 
"exotic" crop could be enroled in Crop Insurance as if it was an only field of 
wheat and insured at the coverage level of the participant. A further condition 
of participation would be that the producer write a two page report to describe 
the agronomic practices used. The participant would also be required to show 
the plot to three neighbours and have them sign his crop record form. 
It is obvious that there might be problems in terms of the potential to 
glut markets. Perhaps there would not be enough of some of the desired kinds 
of seed in the spring and some production disasters would occur where the 
management practices were inadequate. However, think of what might be learned. 
Even the disasters could be used in extension programming as examples of what 
not to do. In one year, farmers would not forget how to grow wheat, barley or 
canola! , What would the learning environment be like if 60,000 farmers in 
Saskatchewan and about an equal number in the neighbouring provinces were to 
actively look for some new crop production alternatives? What would this do to 
the demand and direction of research in the future? Would there be some crops 
that proved winners, even though there would not be the potential to grow the 
"exotic crops" on two million acres? At least the knowledge base and human 
capital would be increased. 
A brief story may illustrate the importance of flexibility and not being 
, confined;\'l;to the beaten track. Two Norwegians, Ole and Severn, were out hunting 
moose when they came across a railway track and began to follow it. 30 Soon a 
train come up behind them, gaining rapidly. "Run, Severn, Run!" exclaimed Ole. 
After running for about a mile the train was much closer and Severn said to Ole, 
"Should we try to run in the bush, Ole?" A puffing Ole replied "If we can't 
outrun 'em in the straight go, we'll never outrun 'em in the bush!" 
Perhaps we should consider how Canada is attempting to outrun the Americans 
and the EC in the grain trade war. How many of their bureaucrats and lawyers 
would it take to design and implement a farm program for each of the "exotic 
crops" that Prairie farmers might attempt to grow in the experimental 
agricultural program (SCGP III)? Would this be the best mechanism to weather 
the trade war • a form of "taking to the hills" as innocent bystanders have had 
to do to save themselves during military conflicts throughout history? 
Canada has farmers who are capable of learning alternative production 
processes rapidly, if the regulatory framework gives them the opportunity. 
Canadians should seek to use the regulatory process to create opportunities. 
The challenge for Canadian agriculture policy makers is to develop enabling 
legislation, not disabling legislation. 
3Drwo out of the three aut~~ are of Norwegian decent so they feel 
comfortable telling the anecdote. 
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